Specialities |
| Manufacturer | TRICONEX (FoxGuard) |
| Product title | TRICON V.10
TRIDENT(for smaller applications up to 450 points) |
| Strength |
1. Much memory for the user program, extendable.
2. Fast new CPU with new µP. Shorter cycle times, but no information's about safety time or complete reaction time from Triconex!
3. Remote I/O coupling via optical conductors with Triconex module (RXM).
4. Floating point processor available.
5. Direct communication with Foxboro DCS I/A series. Connection via redundant Ethernet module (ACM) within the Triconex system to the Foxboro I/A series nodebus. Coupling may also be in redundant.
6. Communication to the Honeywell PLS TDC3000 directly with Triconex module (SMM) to the UCN bus Honeywell. Coupling may also be in redundant.
7. Intelligent communication module with 4 serial ports (MODBUS) and 1 parallel port (Centronics, EICM).
8. Event recording (SOE) integrated.
9. Programming interface according to IEC 61131-3 on Windows NT. Currently 4 programming languages are realised: Structured text, function block diagram, cause and effect matrix (CAE) and ladder diagram.
10. The TRICON fulfils the NRC guidelines in compliance with EPRI TR-107330 (requirements ... safety related app. In nuclear power plants).
11. TRIDENT certified up to SIL3 according IEC 61508 (new standard for safety related PLC).
12. 3oo3 (3-2-1-0) is possible only done via software, but not allowed for safety functions. |
| Weakness |
1. Triconex sales have dropped in 1999-2000 from $90M to $45M. Their European presence has dropped from 17 to 1 technical service person.
2. TRICON bigger extent on space with small and medium projects (high basic work, I/O subrack 9 units high).
3. No input modules with line supervision available.
4. No safety related relay outputs available.
5. No special modules for proximity switches available (possible only with a very expensive analogue input module).
6. No module for hazardous areas (Ex)i available.
7. To get the possibility to interchange I/O modules always a redundant slot has to remain free directly near by the active module (hot spare) weather it is used or not.
8. Complete redundancy can only be made if the backup slots are populated. Normally the hot spare is not installed.
9. Availability: Failures 3 times more with the same complexity.
10. MTTF of Triconex modules approximately 8 times higher as of a comparable HIMA module.
11. External relay required for the secondary means of de-energization in AK6. In addition periodical test of the relay (every 6 months).
12. No mixing approved and not approved mdules. If you decide to mix them, you must check that it will not affect the safe functions.
13. Test of the memory by processing 2 kB data per processor and cycle. It takes up to 25 s to test the existing 1 MB memory.
14. The triplicated channels are susceptible to common cause faults, because they are linked together for voting, or all 3 input and output channels reside on the same module. The three µP are on the same backplane. External communication channels are single.
15. Error in one channel on one module -> no further tests of the other channels.
16. An unresolved fault is only detected with comparison. No diagnostic where the fault has occurred.
17. TMR is loading data through the EICM interface, which is not triplicated or diagnosed. The interface is only once tested during booting.
18. Every fault activates the time limitation.
19. Many limitations of on-line modifications:
no removing of parts of applications,
software only can be added but not deleted on-line,
no changes of function blocks,
no changes at the amount of signals to exchanged via serial communication,
no change of the system software (operating system, I/O driver,...).
20. PID function and other 'control algorithms' are not suitable for safety related functions.
21. Triconex will not guarantee upward compatibility (V8 to V9, V10 new CPU, Trident is not compatible with anything). |
| Specialities in prices |
1. Digital I/O HIMA cheaper.
2. Analogue I/O equal price. |
| Remarks |
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